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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to explore the role of human tracking technology, primarily the use of global
positioning systems (GPS) in locating individuals for the purposes of mutual legal assistance (MLA), and
providing location intelligence for use in inter-state police cooperation within the context of transnational
crime. GPS allows for the 24/7 continuous real-time tracking of an individual, and is considered manifold
more powerful than the traditional visual surveillance often exercised by the police. As the use of GPS for
human tracking grows in the law enforcement sector, federal and state laws in many countries are to a
great extent undefined or even contradictory, especially regarding the need to obtain warrants before the
deployment of location surveillance equipment. This leaves courts ruling on transnational crimes in the
precarious position of having to rely on age-old precedents which are completely void to the new
capabilities of today’s tracking technologies. On one side of the debate are civil libertarians who believe
the individual’s right to be let alone is being eroded to the compromise of human rights, and on the other
side are law enforcement agencies who wish to provide more precise evidence to judges and juries during
hearings against suspects (particularly in issues pertaining to national security). This paper argues that
there is a radical middle position, the via media: that a warrant process is legislatively defined and not
only for MLAs but also to formalise existing informal inter-state police cooperation. Safeguards are
required to overcome the potential misuse of human tracking technologies by police officials and others
in positions of power. And this particularly in light of the emerging implantable high-tech identification
and tracking devices now commercially available.
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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to explore the role of human tracking technology, primarily
the use of global positioning systems (GPS) in locating individuals for the purposes of
mutual legal assistance (MLA), and providing location intelligence for use in inter-state
police cooperation within the context of transnational crime. GPS allows for the 24/7
continuous real-time tracking of an individual, and is considered manifold more powerful
than the traditional visual surveillance often exercised by the police. As the use of GPS
for human tracking grows in the law enforcement sector, federal and state laws in many
countries are to a great extent undefined or even contradictory, especially regarding the
need to obtain warrants before the deployment of location surveillance equipment. This
leaves courts ruling on transnational crimes in the precarious position of having to rely on
age-old precedents which are completely void to the new capabilities of today’s tracking
technologies. On one side of the debate are civil libertarians who believe the individual’s

right to be let alone is being eroded to the compromise of human rights, and on the other
side are law enforcement agencies who wish to provide more precise evidence to judges
and juries during hearings against suspects (particularly in issues pertaining to national
security). This paper argues that there is a radical middle position, the via media: that a
warrant process is legislatively defined and not only for MLAs but also to formalise
existing informal inter-state police cooperation. Safeguards are required to overcome
the potential misuse of human tracking technologies by police officials and others in
positions of power. And this particularly in light of the emerging implantable high-tech
identification and tracking devices now commercially available.
Keywords: inter-state police cooperation, law enforcement, intelligence, global
positioning systems (GPS), human tracking, covert surveillance, privacy, human rights

1

Mutual legal assistance in locating the accused

Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)1 can be defined as a mechanism by
which lawyers and the courts of one jurisdiction can request assistance
from another. MLAs ensure that individuals cannot evade prosecution
simply because the evidence to prosecute them is located in another
country. The MLA document states the required assistance sought in the
provision of evidence for criminal proceedings or proceedings about to
commence. 2 Depending on the domestic law and that law of the
requested State, the most common types of assistance that is usually
obtained includes: witness interviews and material held by third parties
(such as telecommunication documents, phone records, e-mail, facsimile
billing and subscriber information).3 This paper deals with the latter and
specifically the use of covert location-based surveillance. MLAs should be
used when evidence cannot be gathered using informal police-to-police
cooperation.
In the treaty between the Government of Australia and the
Government of the United States of America on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, the scope of assistance ranges from ‘providing
documents, records, and other articles of evidence; locating or identifying
persons; and executing requests for searches and seizures and for
1

Mutual legal assistance was developed during the 1960s but its origins can be found in the
century-old practice known as “Letters Rogatory.” Letters Rogatory is based on the principle of
comity, when the ‘… courts of one state address a request to those of another state for judicial
assistance in the form of taking the testimony of a witness or securing tangible evidence.’ See
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, International and Comparative
Criminal Law Series (2003) 352. See also Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, International
Criminal Law (2003) 231. MLAs abide by the locus regit actum rule.

2

International Association of Prosecutors, Basic Guide to Prosecutors in Obtaining Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (2004) 2.

3

Ibid. See also, the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth). This Act should be
read together with the following relevant Australian legislation: Foreign Evidence Act 1994
(Cth), Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth),
and the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth). Only by studying the various Acts can one
appreciate the complexity of MLATs and the various considerations that need to be grasped in
making a request to a given state, or satisfying a request by another state.

restitution’.4 ‘These forms of legal assistance can be conducted by the
judicial, prosecutorial or law enforcement personnel of the requested
state.’ 5 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) can be bilateral or
multilateral.6 ‘As of the 1960s, the practice of many states (within Europe,
Latin America, the United States, and Canada) shifted to bilateral
MLATs… Still the number of bilateral MLATs is far less than bilateral
extradition treaties, as is the number of states having national legislation
on the subject…’7 States have become increasingly willing to negotiate
MLATs, 8 particularly since 11 September 2001 (9/11), as a means to
increased access of evidence located abroad.9
What is unique about MLATs is that they are only really meant to
benefit governments, and only governments can make exclusive use of
evidence to satisfy a given request. However, governments are under no
obligation to provide evidence and they can reject a request based on any
number of grounds.10 MLATs in most instances contain provisions for
human rights but through reservations and safeguards which are ‘built-in’
4

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Treaty between the Government of Australia and the
Government of the United States of America on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, and
Exchange of Notes (2000).

5

Bassiouni, above 1, 354.

6

The 1959 Council of Europe Convention on MLA in Criminal Matters which was ratified in 1962
was one of the first multilateral treaties and is recognized as an important step in international
judicial co-operation. See Bantekas, above 1, 234.

7

Bassiouni, above 1, 353.

8

Bantekas, above 1, 231.

9

See, eg, Attorney-General’s Department, Annual Report 2004-2005 (2005)
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE09780
1FF)~80Recent+Statistics.pdf/$file/80Recent+Statistics.pdf> at 1 June 2007. The number of
requests made by Australia carried forward from 2003–04 were 170, new requests made in
2004–05 were 151, requests finalized were 126, and requests continuing were 195. The
majority of requests came from the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and the United States of
America, and the majority type of assistance granted was for telecommunications and email
records etc, and bank and business records. A similar number of requests were made to
Australia, indicating that MLATs are highly reciprocal in nature.

10

Bassiouni, above 1, 354.

to protect the accused. It is important to note, that MLAs can only be
executed by remaining in accordance with the law of the requested state,
without violating third party rights. In the context of search for and seizure
of evidence using location surveillance, this becomes very important.11

2

Inter-state police cooperation for information gathering
and sharing

Given the number of requests published in annual reports by
government agencies, and the highly publicized media accounts of
increasing transnational crime, 12 it is obvious that the collection and
exchange of relevant information pertaining to a transnational criminal
investigation happens through informal police cooperation at a federal
level. 13 One can conclude from this that mutual assistance and
police-to-police assistance are complementary. However, while law
enforcement and intelligence cooperation is increasing, it is not regarded
in the same way from a legal perspective. For instance, there are no
treaties applicable to law enforcement or police cooperation as there are
for mutual assistance, nor are there codes of conduct for how information
should be gathered and shared between government agencies.14 When
11

Bantekas, above 1, 233-234. See also, Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/117, subsequently amended by General
Assembly resolution 53/112 (entered into force 14 December 1990). In the context of human
rights, see, Ian Brownlie and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill (es), Basic Documents on Human Rights
(2002).

12

See, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Seventh United Nations Survey on Crime
Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1998 - 2000), (2006)
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_survey_seventh.html> at 4 June 2007. Compare
with data found in Attorney-General’s Department, above 9. The statistics for MLAs and
national/international crime trends indicates that a great number of investigations do not go
through the MLA process but via the more informal police-to-police cooperation route.

13

Bantekas, above 1, 236, 261. ‘Despite the increased willingness of States to engage in formal
methods of mutual legal assistance, there are many other less formal methods of evidence
gathering, which permit law enforcement agencies to exchange information and material
relevant to transnational investigations.’

14

Bassiouni, above 1, 368. Bassiouni is strong in his stance commenting: ‘[r]egrettably, this
important form of international cooperation [ie police cooperation in transnational crime] has
not yet been included in mutual legal assistance treaties.’

one considers the need for location surveillance 15 and other forms of
covert surveillance, particularly in the gathering of evidence, ‘there are no
legal or judicial safeguards to insure effective and regulated modalities of
information-gathering and information-sharing between intelligence, law
enforcement, and prosecutorial agencies.’ 16 In fact, regulation is the
major problem here. How are potential abuses combated17 and how is
effectiveness maintained? How can the accuracy of information be
guaranteed? And what of privacy when international practices vary
greatly? These are the challenges that new technologies and emerging
law enforcement workflows pose on the due process of law.
As any other organization in a given jurisdiction, law enforcement
agencies are bound by national criminal law at the domestic level. Yet,
many have questioned whether this is enough given that intelligence and
law enforcement agencies have been quite secretive about their practices.
For the greater part the way that these particular organizations have
shared intelligence has been outside legal or judicial supervision.18 Thus,
the problem is two-fold: (i) a legal framework in most jurisdictions does not
exist to aid in regulation, and (ii) there is a reluctance of members of the
intelligence sector to provide transparency in their activities within a
15

Katina Michael et al, ‘Location-Based Intelligence – Modeling Behavior in Humans using GPS’
(2006) International Symposium on Technology and Society (ISTAS ‘06) 1.

16

Bassiouni, above 1, 369. See also, Commission New South Wales. Law Reform, Surveillance:
An Interim Report (2001).

17

John S. Ganz, ‘Comment: It’s Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need Warrants
to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices’ (2005) 95 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 1360.
‘Finally, again from a policy perspective, some might argue that the failure to require warrants
could lead to arbitrary and capricious use of GPS by police. As dissenting Nevada Supreme
Court Justice Robert Rose noted in Osburn, “The automobile’s use is a necessity in most parts
of Nevada, and place a monitor on an individual’s vehicle effectively tracks that person’s every
movement just as if the person had it on his or her person… I fear that in some instances, the
monitor will be used to continually monitor individuals only because law enforcement considers
them “dirty.” In the future, innocent citizens, and perhaps elected officials or even a police
officer’s girlfriend or boyfriend, will have their whereabouts continually monitored simply
because someone in law enforcement decided to take such action. This gives too much
authority to law enforcement and permits the police to use the vehicle monitor without any
showing necessity and without a limit on the duration of the personal intrusion.”’

18

Bassiouni, above 1, 369.

judicial system.19 This issue has been exacerbated since 9/11 when the
United States demanded that states share more information with them,
and that their intelligence personnel gather more data so as to curb such
terrorist20 acts in the future.21 Recent events have shown the power of
data accessibility, with numerous terrorist plots foiled by intelligence
organizations, preventing mass casualties.22 But at the same time the
rights of individuals to know that data is being collected about them, to be
able to rectify erroneous data, to protect privacy is also important.23 The
whole debate over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) allegedly located
in Iraq, which was later proven to be unreliable, indicated the systemic
flaws in American intelligence which were blamed primarily on
management.24 Interestingly, the result of this flaw, quite legitimately, was
for American intelligence agencies to increase information sharing even
more. 25 One can be lead to the hypothesis that greater intelligence
19

Ibid.

20

For comparative definitions of terrorism see, Claire De Than and Edwin Shorts, International
Criminal Law and Human Rights (2003) 231-237.

21

Terrorism is considered to be just one reason why information gathering and sharing practices
have increased, other notable transnational crimes include: drug and people trafficking, money
laundering, and the smuggling of things. See eg, the role of intelligence in security informatics
in Hsinchu Chen, Intelligence and Security Informatics for International Security (2006).

22

See, eg, Transportation Security Administration, Information on Plot to Attack John F. Kennedy
Airport (2007) <http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/jfk_terror_plot.shtm> at 2 June 2007.

23

Bassiouni, above 1, 370. There are however efforts between nations to broker agreements that
do try to address data protection principles, at least in theory. See, eg, Agreement Between the
United States of America and the European Police Officer, Europol file no. 3710-60r2 (Dec 6,
2001), Supplement Agreement Between the United States of America and the European
Police on the Exchange of Personal Data and Related Information, Europol file no. 3710/60r3
(Dec. 20, 2002). “Europol is essentially a police coordination centre for collecting, analyzing
and sharing information to help investigations being carried out in two or more EU countries”.
European Commission, Freedom, Security and Justice for All (2004) 19. See also, OECD,
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1981).

24

GlobalSecurity.org, Intelligence: Additional Views of Senator Olympia Snowe (2004)
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2004_rpt/iraq-wmd-intell_olympia-snowe
.htm> at 3 June 2007.

25

Ibid. ‘Surprisingly, the Committee’s review reveals that even after the lack of information
sharing was found to have played a key role in the intelligence failures of September 11, 2001,

effectiveness is proportional to the amount of information shared by
states but this too has implications for privacy. Not only is the balance
between personal privacy and national security almost impossible to
achieve but intelligence born from “überveillance-type” regimes can
introduce the potential for misinformation and misinterpretation. Going to
one extreme or the other has negative implications- i.e. making all
personal data public might increase transparency in the short-term but
may have the equal effect of increasing identity fraud in the long-term,
and not engaging in any information sharing practices would be
detrimental to a nation’s security.

3

The nature of evidence and the new technologies

Evidence takes on two basic forms, that which is a written statement
in place of oral transmission, and anything on which something can be
recorded. High-tech gadgetry is becoming increasingly useful in storing
recorded information digitally. Not only can miniature devices do so with
incredible amounts of storage power but they can do so continually 24/7,
using very little on-board battery power and with a relatively low degree of
risk to humans. Digital documentary evidence that has been used in ad
hoc tribunals for instance includes aerial photography, audio and video
tapes, maps and sketches of plans, and a variety of digital record formats.
‘Such evidence is deemed admissible if it contains information of
probative value.’ 26 Digital evidence especially is prone to tampering
however this is the emerging context in which courts now have to operate.
New technologies, which have allowed for covert surveillance to be
performed without the permission of a given state, highlight the need for

intelligence agencies still fail to share information within and among its own cadre. … For
example, the CIA failed to share information on the reliability of two biological weapons
sources with all Iraq biological weapons analysts. Information about the credibility of these
sources, upon which many assumptions regarding Iraq’s biological weapons program were
made, could have significantly altered analysts’ judgments. In addition, the CIA failed to share
some intelligence reporting with other agency [unmanned aerial vehicle] UAV analysts on
critical issues surrounding Iraq’s UAVs. … The Committee’s review shows that the CIA
continues to overly compartment sensitive HUMINT reporting and that this lack of information
sharing prevented key analysts on certain issues from making fully informed judgments.’
26

Bassiouni, above 1, 656.

regulation.27 One need only point to the Echelon operation, which was
first considered a wild conspiracy, but which was later shown to be a
mass surveillance operation by the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand on major European industries. ‘It
was in short a major scandal of governmental industrial espionage
against friendly states.’ 28 It is not being argued here that new
technologies should not be exploited to their maximum potential to
prevent or suppress criminality but they presently remain unregulated. So
in admitting evidence that has been gathered in another country, national
courts need to maintain that the evidence has been gathered within the
confines of a given state’s domestic law, and not by any other means.29 If
we cannot be confident in this, then not only are we making sweeping
assumptions about the reach of laws but we are creating a law unto
ourselves, to do as we please, as we see fit. When comparing the
comprehensive and robust MLA process (although to some seemingly
long-winded and bureaucratic), with just-in-time inter-state police
cooperation, one can come to the resolution that there is a great divide
that needs to be bridged. With reference to police cooperation, it must be
said, that better processes with regulations at an inter-state and
international level, can only increase the likelihood that cross-border
criminals will be brought to justice and tried under the most suitable laws,
resulting in a better outcome for all parties concerned.30
In an attempt to bridge that gap the United Nations adopted the
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in 2000 that
addressed but did not regulate the question of inter-state law enforcement
cooperation.31 Articles 26-28 raise the matter of bilateral and multilateral
27

Bantekas, above 1, 240. ‘Due to the nature of modern telecommunications systems,
interception frequently does not require technical assistance from other States.’

28

Bassiouni, above 1, 371-373.

29

Bassiouni, above 1, 374. See also, Bantekas, above 1, 255. Interestingly however, ‘… the
Court is prepared to focus on the nature of the evidence rather than the fact that human rights
standards have been breached.’

30

David Lanham, Cross-border Criminal Law (1997) 44-45.

31

See also, Bantekas, above 1, 236. In Title VI of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) a similar
hope was set out, to develop ‘common action among Member States in the fields of police and

agreements inviting ‘… state parties in accordance with their national
legal systems to develop national legislation permitting special
investigative techniques’, 32 which could then be extended beyond the
borders and applicable to law enforcement and intelligence organizations.
The articles specifically addressed forms of electronic surveillance and
how they might be used in joint investigative operations. For example,
although it took several years to agree on, Member States finally ratified a
convention which would allow them in appropriate circumstances to
intercept communications directly. 33 It should be highlighted that the
convention was seen as going soft on data protection and in allowing for
dubious practices such as that of cross-border observation, in actual fact,
hot pursuit of suspects or fugitives by foreign police officers across
borders.34
There is ‘… no evidence [that] exists outside court proceedings.’35 In
common law countries facts must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.36 For a definite conclusion to be sought however, the evidence
which has been gathered must also have been collected with the same
level of confidence. ‘Implicit in the right to a fair trial is the rejection of
evidence obtained in breach of fundamental human rights standards.’37
New technologies and techniques however may not coerce an individual
judicial co-operation in criminal matters.’ The EU has been to some degree successful at
achieving these goals, at least insofar as communicating standards, guidelines and protocols
to Member States.
32

Bassiouni, above 1, 375. See also, Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter (eds), Global Surveillance
and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity (2005).

33

Bantekas, above 1, 239, 259. ‘In addition to avoiding formal procedures, prosecuting
authorities engage in informal mutual co-operation practices by simply allowing police officers
in another jurisdiction access to evidence.’

34

Ibid 279.

35

Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003) 421.

36

Ibid 425.

37

Bantekas, above 1, 254-255, 284. Proceedings from the Corpus Juris Project in Europe stated
‘(1) [e]vidence must be excluded if it was obtained by community or national agents either in
violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights…’

to confessing to a crime, but may apply irregular methods of data
collection that in some instances could be considered a type of
intimidation.38 A frequent happening in international criminal proceedings
is when a prosecutor does not wish to disclose their source of information
for reasons of confidentiality, safety, or other. 39 Quite often secret
intelligence organizations are not prepared to tell the public how they
obtained a particular record or document, and in many instances the
evidence provided is still accepted. 40 Courts are faced with a difficult
choice when it is obvious that unlawful means have been used to obtain
evidence- excluding the evidence may mean doing away with the reliable
information, while admitting it legitimized illicit and irregular modes of
investigations.41

4

Human tracking technologies used for location
intelligence

How are authorities able to locate individuals who are suspected of
transnational crimes for the purpose of MLA requests and inter-state
police cooperation? ‘Mobility is a basic and indispensable human activity
that is essential for us to be able to lead independent lives on a daily
basis’.42 Criminals suspected of a crime- like every other human being38

Ibid 245, 246. See, eg, ‘[i]n R v Terry, the court also held that the Charter of Rights has no
effect on law enforcement officials abroad, and as such does not render illegally obtained
evidence inadmissible. …However, the failure to reject evidence which was obtained not
merely in breach of foreign law, but also in violation of international human rights standards …
is lamentable and demonstrates a lack of sensitivity and understanding of the rules operating
in other legal systems.’

39

Bassiouni, above 1, 656-657. ‘The problem, however, is when this evidence is provided by
intelligence agencies who do not wish to have their sources disclosed. This issue of
confidentiality of sources makes it difficult, if not impossible, to use valuable information.’

40

Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003) 424.

41

Liam Byrne, ‘Admission of Evidence Obtained in Breach of Privacy Laws’ (2007) (78)
Precedent 21. English, Canadian, American, Australian, Irish and Scottish courts all differ on
their positions regarding what constitutes ‘lawful methods’ of data gathering for admittance of
evidence in their courts.

42

K. Kayama, I.E. Yairi and S. Igi, ‘Semi-Autonomous Outdoor Mobility Support System for
Elderly and Disabled People’ (2003) International Conference on Intelligent Robots and

require to move around in public space in order to satisfy basic living
requirements. Someone who is moving can be tracked manually or
digitally, even if they (or persons harboring criminals) are using cash to
pay for their every transaction.43 The information being gathered as a
person moves from one place to the next can be considered a type of
chronicle or breadcrumb. Today, given the high-tech devices available to
law enforcement and intelligence organizations, an electronic chronicle44
and electronic breadcrumb45 can be gathered, stored, and manipulated
for presentation at a later date. To allow oneself to be tracked can be a
voluntary act, but in most cases it is imposed by a third party who has
some control over the end-user.46 Tracking can be obtrusive taking the
form of overt surveillance 47 (ie the individual knows they are being
followed), or as in most cases tracking is unobtrusive taking the form of
covert surveillance (ie the individual is not aware that they are being

Systems 2606.
43

Stephane Leman-Langlois, ‘The Myopic Panopticon: The Social Consequences of Policing
through the Lens’ (2003) 13(1) Policing and Society 51, 54. ‘The combination of face
recognition, motion analysis and sound analysis could become very interesting in the near
future.’ Leman-Langlois writes of an ‘omniscient surveillance.’ See also, the notion of
‘überveillance’ in Katina Michael et al, above 15, 7.

44

G. Pingali and R. Jain, ‘Electronic Chronicles: Empowering Individuals, Groups, and
Organisations’ (2005) IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and Expo 1540.

45

Wherify, Wireless Location Services (2005) <http://www.wherifywireless.com/> at 29 May
2007.

46

R. Cucchiara, C. Grana, and G. Tardini, ‘Track-based and Object-based Occlusion for People
Tracking Refinement in Indoor Surveillance’ (2004) Proceedings of the ACM 2nd International
Workshop on Video Surveillance & Sensor Networks 81-87. Tracking is critical in the process
‘of people motion capture, people behavior control and indoor video surveillance.’ See also,
Clive Norris, Jade Moran and Gary Armstrong, Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television and
Social Control (1998).

47

Stephen Green, ‘A Plague on the Panopticon: Surveillance and Power in the Global
Information Economy’ (1999) 2(1) Information, Communication & Society 31. ‘In the United
Kingdom, Newcastle police claim that CCTV has led directly to 2,800 arrests from 1991-9, with
99 per cent of offenders pleading guilty when presented with video evidence … In contrast to
more radical libertarian accounts, the key point here is that not every sacrifice of individual
autonomy and ‘privacy’ is the same as the loss of freedom…’

tracked).
Today, tracking is possible via a vast array of technologies- from GPS
devices, to radio beepers, electronic mail, and even fixed and mobile
telephony.48 In fact, the use of a mobile phone in most more-developed
countries means that a location fix within about 50 meters of the user’s
handset is possible, just by an individual having their phone on. 49
Increasingly, mobile phones are also being equipped with GPS chipsets
which means that if a mobile device is outdoors, a service provider can
perform a position fix within seconds if a request is made by the police.50
And it is not only the location position fix that is revealing, even more
telling is the continuous, real-time location information that can be
gathered by a GPS, including accurate geodetic information, such as
longitude and latitude, time and speed.51 Beyond statistical data, location
intelligence ‘reveals a great deal about one’s preferences, friends,
48

William A. Herbert, ‘No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with Human Tracking
Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?’ (2007) 2(2) I/S: A Journal of
Law and Policy 410. ‘‘In contemporary American culture, some view the concept of freedom as
being manifested in consumerism, with the ubiquitous cell phone as a primary symbol. It is
doubtful that most cell phone users are aware that the same technology that grants them this
sense of freedom, also results in wireless companies, receiving automatic and continuous
updates regarding their location. Physical possession of a cell phone renders an individual
vulnerable to location surveillance by government entities…’

49

Katina Michael ‘Location-based Services: a Vehicle for IT&T Convergence’ in K. Cheng et al
(eds), Advances in e-Engineering and Digital Enterprise Technology 467. It should be noted
that GPS data is not foolproof. Speed miscalculations, location fix inaccuracies, signal
dropouts, can all occur due to the physical structures that the GPS passes through, and even
to changes in climatic conditions, and the presence of dense foliage.

50

Leman-Langlois, above 43, 46. ‘First, there is deterrence: overt surveillance aimed primarily at
discouraging potential offenders from actually committing crimes. Second, intelligence
gathering: a police force may be interested in collecting images for their information content, to
build files, understand relationships, create chronologies, etc. Third, evidence: evidence is
information that meets basic legal requirements and is thus admissible in court to support the
accusation of a suspect.’

51

Ganz, above 17, 1329. ‘One model, which a Law Enforcement Technology Magazine reviewer
called a “vehicle tracking system that would make James Bond envious,” sells for $2,396 per
unit. Users pay $59 per month of tracking data used. The product can be attached to a car in
thirty seconds and operates anywhere in the United States, Canada and Mexico where cell
towers exist.’

associations, and habits.’52 Till now law enforcement agencies have used
GPS to investigate murder cases, drug investigations, robbery, public
corruption, probation violations and hostage situations.

5

GPS evidence in Court- case law examples in the United
States

Although GPS technology has been used in law enforcement since
the early 1990s,53 it is only recently that a few cases have been heard
regarding the validity of using GPS tracking technology on suspected
criminals.54 All of the cases presented here are based on case law in the
United States. The Fourth Amendment in the United States Constitution is
the main source of legislation pertaining to the protection of an individual’s
right to privacy. ‘At present, the United States Supreme Court has not
ruled on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to most recent forms
of human tracking technology.’55 There have been some landmark cases
however, that have pointed towards the requirements for warrants to
conduct surveillance activities. Compare for instance the cases Olmstead
v. United States with Katz v. United States. In 1928 the United States
Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit
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the action of eavesdropping using telecommunications networks, while
almost forty years later in 1967 the Court held that the FBI’s use of a
microphone on the roof of a payphone, without a warrant, constituted a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.56 Still, the Court ruled that using a
tracking device to monitor vehicles or objects was not subject to the
expectation of a privacy test. For example, a person traveling in a car on a
public road from A to B had no reasonable expectation of privacy as he or
she was out-n-about in full view of the public.57 This decision was again
reaffirmed in 1983 in the United States v. Knotts case when the Supreme
Court again ruled ‘that the police did not have to obtain a warrant under
the Fourth Amendment before using a radio beeper to monitor the
movement and location of a vehicle.’58 The Court portrayed beepers as a
mere replication of the traditional, manual, police visual surveillance
conducted via physically tailing a vehicle.
In Kyllo v. United States in 2001 yet another twist to the interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment was played out. The Supreme Court declared
that protections within the boundaries of the home were only limited to
devices that were not in “general public use”.59 When one considers the
proliferation of mobile telephones many of which are now location-aware
or GPS devices that are now found in up-market vehicle models, the
United States human tracking possibilities look vast. What may this mean
for average citizens wishing to take the law into their own hands and
begin to track one another?
56
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warrant before engaging in electronic surveillance, the Katz decision established a significant
judicial check on government agents randomly engaging in such surveillance.’ In Katz it was
also interesting to note a shift in emphasis from protecting a place where someone resides, to
protecting the person from government intrusion.
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At the state and local levels, courts hold differing positions based on
their jurisdiction. For the greater part, warrants must be obtained prior to
the operation of an electronic device to track an individual. In
Washington’s highest court the power of GPS to be more than a tracking
device was recognized:
[U]se of GPS tracking devices is a particularly intrusive method
of surveillance, making it possible to acquire an enormous
amount of personal information about a citizen under
circumstances where the individual is unaware that every
single vehicle trip taken and the duration of every single stop
may be recorded by the government.60
However, in the cases People v. Lacey and People v. Gant the
opposite judgment was reached on the same question of warrant
requirements for a GPS tracking device on a vehicle.61 This seemingly
contradictory position of the State of Illinois is disturbing especially when
one considers the federal constitution in context and the requirement for
inter-state agreements in locating criminals or proceeds of crime. Two of
the most high profile cases where data was gathered using a GPS and
admitted as evidence was in the 1999 State v. Jackson and in 2003 State
v. Peterson. In the Jackson case a judge executed a search warrant on
Jackson’s vehicles and residence for ten days, and then subsequently
granted two more warrants which were extensions of time for the police to
continue with covert surveillance.
Specifically, data showed that on November 6th, Jackson drove
his truck to rural Springdale and parked without leaving for
forty-five minutes. On November 10th, Jackson made a trip to
Vicari and Springdale, two remote sites, where he remained for
sixteen minutes and thirty minutes, respectively. The police
discovered Valiree’s body in a shallow grave at the Springdale
site and promptly arrested Jackson.62
60
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It was the Jackson case which really demonstrated the power of GPS
tracking technology to justices all over America, in terms of the privacy
implications. Counter-arguments grew however as questions were raised
about trusting law enforcement personnel to act appropriately. 63 In
addition, the question of the right to privacy by a suspected criminal also
came to the fore. 64 It was not until the Peterson case that a judge
reaffirmed that GPS location data was acceptable and fundamentally
valid as a generic methodology to employ in gathering evidence for a
trial.65 What these example cases reveal is that the warrant process and
admissibility of evidence varies dependent on the jurisdiction. This is
magnified when one considers the absence of provisions in an
international setting.66
More recently the reliability of GPS data has come into question.
While the technology can have almost pinpoint accuracy, it does suffer
from technological limitations depending on environmental factors. There
are a growing band of domestic GPS-related cases in the United States,
which have either been lodged by individuals or unions,67 challenging
companies or employers regarding GPS accuracy and the individual’s
right to be let alone.68 In most of the cases to do with accuracy, GPS
63
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February
2007)
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<http://gpstrackingsystems.biz/7th-circuit-us-court-of-appeals-okays-surreptitious-gps-trackin
g-by-police/25/> at 1 October 2007. ‘The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable
search and seizure, but the judges ruled that the placement of a GPS tracking device without
the suspect’s knowledge, does not qualify as a search of his car. This is the first time the

speed miscalculations or position fixes are at the heart of the matteremployees have either been fined for speeding in a company vehicle (e.g.
truck), or individual consumers have been charged an additional levy for
allegedly crossing state boundaries (e.g. car hire).69 In October of 2007,
there were a few cases reported that stipulated that the U.S. government
had terminated an employee’s contract based on data collected covertly
using the GPS chipset in the government-owned mobile handset carried
by the employee. 70 Most of these latter cases have focused on the
physical location of the employee- e.g. that employees were claiming
financial remuneration for hours not physically worked at the office. But
this too is open to misinterpretation- what if the employee worked through
his/her lunch break, or took work home with them? We can see by this
example how GPS data can reveal only partial truths and cannot be used
as the sole piece of evidence. GPS data also has to be stored
somewhere- and herein lies its greatest weakness- longitude and latitude
position coordinates can be changed on the fly to fabricate evidence (for
or against the defendant). Currently only 2 states in the U.S. require a
company to let an employee know when they are monitoring them. These
cases are only indicative of potential international issues that may arise
when GPS is used to track suspects.

seventh circuit has weighed in on this issue, which other circuits have split on. The court
equated GPS tracking to police physically following a car, or monitoring safety cameras to
follow a car, neither of which amounts to illegal search and seizure.’
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FindLaw
(23
August
2005)
Technology
to
Monitor
Our
Driving?
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used GPS installed in its cars to monitor renters’ speed as they traveled. Whenever GPS
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See, eg, Allen Stern, Man Fired Thanks to GPS Tracking (31 August 2007)
<http://www.centernetworks.com/man-fired-thanks-to-gps-tracking> Center Networks at 1
October 2007. ‘The NY Post reports, “Schools Chancellor Joel Klein yesterday fired a veteran
worker whose movements were tracked for five months through the GPS device in his
cellphone, leading to charges that he was repeatedly cutting out early.’

6

Human rights v. national security

Privacy advocates and civil libertarians often point to the erosion of
human rights through the development and application of novel
technologies in the area of law enforcement. It is true, that the new
innovations pose legal and political challenges but a balance must be
struck between their usage for legitimate purposes such as in the case of
fulfilling an MLA request or formalised inter-state police cooperation, and
those that may be considered illegal and a breach of citizen privacy.71 The
growing problem is not that these technologies are diffused commercially
but the possibility that if they are used for law enforcement purposes, they
will eventually find their way into government mandated schemes for the
general populous.72 In quoting Jacques Ellul, privacy expert David Lyon,
brings this notion to light:
“To be sure of apprehending criminals, it is necessary that
everyone be supervised.” Substitute the word ‘terrorists’ for
‘criminals’ and we have an uncannily accurate description of
the world since 9/11.73
For now, sweeping legislative changes that have taken place
post-9/11 have coincided with the widespread diffusion and use of human
tracking technologies. 74 The United States has been criticized in
particular for their departure from human rights standards; some even
71
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Alan Davidson, ‘Electronic surveillance regulations’ (2004) 24(9) Proctor 31. ‘The [Patriot] Act
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access to stored email or communication records.’

going as far as concluding that they have shown disregard for the
fundamental principles of international law.’75 Australia also has received
similar backlash by international political commentators:
The new legislation has serious implications for bodily,
territorial, communications and information privacy, specifically
the Australian Security Intelligence Organization Legislation
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth); Anti-Terrorism Act
(No. 2) 2005 (Cth); and the Telecommunications (Interception)
Amendment Act 2006 (Cth).76
Perhaps what is most disturbing about the new legislation is its lack of
clarity in explicitly stating what devices can and cannot be used. For
instance, in the Australian Commonwealth Anti-Terrorism Act, a tracking
device is defined as: ‘…any electronic device capable of being used to
determine or monitor the location of a person or an object or the status of
an object.’77 An electronic device could range from a GPS wristwatch to
an electronic ultra high frequency (UHF) bracelet to an invasive
radio-frequency identification (RFID) implant. In the United States, the
phrase “electronic instrument” is used instead. 78 While legislation is
drafted with the knowledge that technology changes occur at a fast pace,
there is an increasing requirement for clarity, especially as embedded
‘beneath the skin’ technologies rise to the fore. Chip implants clearly
violate the individual’s private space, ie, they penetrate the body. For civil
libertarians the question is who decides whether someone is a suspect to
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a crime? And if someone is innocent until proven guilty then how can a
government justify the use of tracking devices upon one of its citizens?
The argument is that technologies like GPS tracking technology are
manifold more powerful than police visual surveillance and that high-tech
devices allow police to monitor people ‘…for a much longer period of time,
with much less chance of detection.’79

7

Recommendations

There are many recommendations that can be made towards the use
of human tracking technologies in inter-state police-to-police cooperation.
However, first there must be an acknowledgment that there is a via media
in ‘protecting citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy and permitting
law enforcement officials to do their job.’80 The via media is the radical
middle, the radical centre, centrism, and the third way philosophy.81 When
one considers the extreme polar arguments they are inherently flawed.
Compare for instance the staunch position of some civil libertarians who
see all forms of surveillance in all circumstance as a degradation of
human rights versus some secret police organizations who wish to
by-pass all legal procedures. There is surely a middle position with a
workable solution. Parts of the solution may include the constitution of
uniform procedures to be set up and adopted for inter-state police
cooperation, just as there currently are treaties for MLA requests, police
self-regulation to be more explicit about the acceptable use of human
79

Otterberg, above 52, 697-698. ‘The resultant lengthy, detailed record of one’s location then
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tracking technologies with embedded prohibitive clauses, and the
mandate for warrants and court orders to be obtained prior to the
implementation and monitoring of an individual.82 A more difficult goal to
achieve is the alignment of state and federal laws of countries pertaining
to human tracking technologies and their limitations in terms of admissible
evidence in a trial. 83 This will come with time as more and more
international cases are heard on the matter of location intelligence being
used in a court of law to help in the conviction of a criminal.84 These
recommendations are not merely meant to solve band-aid ‘jurisdictional
problems’ when police track individuals across state lines but are
recommendations towards a common protocol.85 Perhaps some of the
more pressing questions that courts will face in the shorter term are: when
is it appropriate to use particular types of electronic devices for
surveillance, for how long, and to monitor what type of activity.86 These
questions become even more complicated when we consider them
across borders.87
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